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Abstract
We extend Armstrong’s (1996) result on exclusion in multi-dimensional
screening models in two key ways, providing support for the view that this
result is quite generic and applicable to many diﬀerent markets. First, we
relax the strong technical assumptions he imposed on preferences and con-
sumer types. Second, we extend the result beyond the monopolistic market
structure to generalized oligopoly settings with entry. We also analyse appli-
cations to several quite diﬀerent settings: credit markets, automobile indus-
try, research grants, the regulation of a monopolist with unknown demand
and cost functions, and involuntary unemployment in the labor market.
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11 Introduction
When considering the problem of screening, where sellers choose a sales mech-
anism and buyers have private information about their types, it is well known that
the techniques used in the multidimensional setting are not as straightforward as
in the one dimensional setting. As a consequence, while we have a host of success-
ful applications with one dimensional types, to date we have only a few scattered
papers that allow for multidimensional types. This is unfortunate because in most
economic applications multidimensional types are needed to capture the basic eco-
nomics of the environment, and the propositions coming from the one dimensional
case do not necessarily generalize to the multidimensional case.1
One of the most celebrated results in the theory of multidimensional screening,
though, comes from Armstrong (1996)w h e r eh es h o w st h a tam o n o p o l i s tw i l lﬁnd
it optimal to not serve some fraction of consumers in equilibrium, even when there
is positive surplus associated with those consumers. In settings where consumers
vary in at least two diﬀerent ways, monopolists will choose a sales mechanism that
excludes a positive measure of consumers. The intuition behind this result is rather
simple: Consider a situation where the monopolist serves all consumers; if she
increases the price by ε>0 she earns extra proﬁts of order O(ε) on the consumers
who still buy the product, but will lose only the consumers whose surplus was below
ε.I fm>1 is the dimension of the vector of consumers’ taste characteristics, then
the measure of the set of the lost consumers is O(εm). Therefore, it is proﬁtable to
increase the price and lose some consumers. In principle, this result has, potentially,
profound implications across a wide range of economic settings. The general belief
that heterogeneity of consumer types is likely to be more than unidimensional
in nature, for many diﬀerent commodities, and that these types are likely to be
private information, underlines the importance of this result.2
However the result itself was derived under a relatively strong set of assump-
tions that could be seen as limiting its applicability, and subsequent research has
identiﬁed conditions under which the result does not hold. In particular, in Arm-
strong’s original analysis, he assumed that the utility functions of the agents are
1See Rochet and Stole (2003) and Basov (2005) for surveys of the literature.
2The type of an economic agent is simply her utility function. If one is agnostic about the
preferences and does not want to impose on them any assumptions beyond, perhaps, monotonicity
and convexity then the most natural assumption is that the type is inﬁnite dimensional.
2homogeneous and convex and in their types, and that these types belong to a
strictly convex and compact body of a ﬁnite dimensional space. Basov (2005) refers
to the latter as the joint convexity assumption and argues that though convexity
of utility and types and convexity of the types set separately are not restrictive
and can be seen as a choice of parametrization, the joint convexity assumption is
technically restrictive.
These assumptions have no empirical foundation, and are nonstandard. For
instance, the benchmark case of independent types does not satisfy these assump-
tions, because the type space, in this case, is a multidimensional box, which is not
strictly convex. There is, in general, no theoretical justiﬁcation for a particular
assumption about the curvature of utility functions with respect to types, as op-
posed to, say, quasi-concavity of utility functions with respect to goods. In the
same line, in general, there is no justiﬁcation, other than analytical tractability,
for type spaces to be convex, and for utility functions to be homogeneous in types.
Both Armstrong (1999b) and Rochet and Stole (2003) found examples outside of
these restrictions where the exclusion set is empty.
As we will argue below these counter-examples constitute knife-edge cases and
are not generic. We will also argue that exclusion is generic under more gen-
eral market structures. i.e. the result is actually quite robust. We then provide
examples where we believe it could also be quite important.
We start with relaxing the joint convexity and homogeneity assumptions, and
show that they are not necessary for the result. Exclusion is generically optimal in
the family of models where types belong to sets of locally ﬁnite perimeter (which
is a class of sets that includes all of the examples the authors are aware of in the
literature) and utility functions are smooth and monotone in types. We show that
the examples considered in Armstrong (1999b) and Rochet and Stole (2003) are,
themselves, very special cases. We then go on to show that the exclusion results
can be generalized to the case of an oligopoly and an industry with free entry.
Therefore, the inability of some consumers to purchase the good at acceptable
terms is solely driven by the multi-dimensional nature of private information rather
than by market conditions or nature or distribution of the consumers’ tastes.
To illustrate the generality of the results, we apply them in several quite dif-
ferent settings: credit markets, the automobile industry, and research grants. We
also pay particular attention to two applications: the ﬁrst being the regulation of
3a monopolist with unknown demand and cost functions, and the second being the
existence of equilibrium involuntary unemployment. The former application picks
up of the analysis in Armstrong (1999b), where he reviews Lewis and Sappington
(1988) and conjectures that exclusion is probably an issue in their analysis. At
the time, Armstrong could not prove the point, due to the lack of a more gen-
eral exclusion result. With our result in hand, we are able to prove Armstrong’s
conjecture. The latter application is a straightforward way of showing that, when
workers have multi-dimensional characteristics, it is generically optimal for em-
ployers (with market power in the labor market) to not hire all workers.
Most generally, we believe that the main result of this paper is that private
information leads to exclusion in any almost any realistic setting. To avoid it
one has either to assume that all allowable preferences lie on a one-dimensional
continuum or construct very speciﬁc type distributions and preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
t h em o n o p o l yp r o b l e mw i t hc o n s u m e r st h a th a v eat y p e - d e p e n d e n to u t s i d eo p t i o n
and the derive conditions under which it is generically optimal to have exclusion.
In Section 3 we generalize the results for the case of oligopoly and a market with
free entry. In Section 4 we discuss how the results can be generalized without the
quasilinearity assumption. Sections 5 and 6 present the application to the regula-
tion of a monopolist with unknown demand and cost functions and to involuntary
unemployment. The Appendix presents some relevant concepts from geometric
measure theory.
2 The Genericity of Exclusion in a Monopolistic
Screening Model
Assume a monopolist faces a continuum of consumers and produces a vector
of n goods x ∈ Rn
+. The cost of production is given by a strictly convex twice
diﬀerentiable cost function c(·):Rn
+ → R. A consumer’s utility is given by:
v(α,x) − t(x)
4where α ∈ Ω is her unobservable type, t(x) is the amount of money transferred
to the monopolist when the consumer purchases x,a n dv : Ω × Rn → R is a con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable function, strictly increasing in both arguments. Moreover,
we will assume that ν(·,x) c a nb ee x t e n d e db yc o n t i n u i t yt oΩ. We assume that
Ω ⊂ U ⊂ Rm is a Lebesgue measurable set with locally ﬁnite perimeter in the
open set U,a n dt h a tα is distributed according to a density f(·) that is Lipschitz
continuous and with supp(f)=Ω compact.3 Consumers have an outside option of
value s0(α), which is assumed to be continuously diﬀerentiable and implementable
and extendable by continuity to Ω.4
The monopolist looks for a selling mechanism that maximizes her proﬁts. The
Taxation Principle (Rochet, 1985) implies that one can, without loss of generality,
assume that the monopolist simply announces a non-linear tariﬀ t(·).
The above considerations can be summarized by the following model. The












v(α,x) − t(x) if max(v(α,x) − t(x)) ≥ s0(α)
x(α)=x0(α) otherwise
, (1)
where x0(α) is the outside option, which implements surplus s0(α).
The cost function c(x) is separable across consumers. Moreover, assume that
t h e r ei saﬁnite solution to the problem of maximizing the joint surplus v(α,x) −
c(x) for every consumer α.L e ts(α) denote the surplus obtained by type α:
s(α)=m a x
x (v(α,x) − t(x)) (2)
The celebrated result of Armstrong (1996) states that if Ω is strictly convex,
v(·,x):Ω → R is a convex, homogenous of degree one function for all x,a n d
3See Evans and Gariepy (1992) and Chlebik (2002) for the relevant concepts from geometric
measure theory. For convenience, a brief summary is presented in the appendix.
4For conditions of implementability of a surplus function see Basov (2005).
5s0(α)=0for all α, then the measure of the set Ω0 = {α ∈ Ω : s(α)=0 } is
positive. We will replace these assumptions with Assumptions 1 and 2 below.
Assumption 1 For any x ∈ Rn
+, the net utility gain of consumption u(·,x) deﬁned
by
u(·,x)=v(·,x) − s0(·) (3)
is strictly increasing in α.
In the case when the value of the outside option is type independent, Assump-
tion 1 reduces to the standard assumption that the utility is increasing in α.
Let ∂eΩ denote the measure theoretic boundary of Ω.B e c a u s e Ω has locally
ﬁnite perimeter, ∂eΩ =
S∞
i=1 Ki ∪N,w h e r eKi is a compact subset of a C1 hyper-
surface Si,f o ri =1 ,2,...,a n dHm−1(N)=0 ,w h e r eHm−1 is the m−1 dimensional
Hausdorﬀ measure.
Assumption 2 For each i =1 ,2...,
Ki = {α ∈ Ω : gi(α,β)=0 }
where gi : Ω × RJ → R is smooth, β ∈ RJ, J ≥ 1, are parameters and, for all
x ∈ Rn







That is, the parameters β determine the underlying set of models that we
consider, and there is one model for which the normal of each Ki a n do fe a c hl e v e l
curve of the utility function are not colinear. As will be clear in the examples
below, Assumption 2 is stronger than what we need: the rank condition has to be
met only at the optimal choices x(α). Also, note that an open set Ω ⊂ Rm with
topological boundary ∂Ω that is locally Lipschitz (that is, ∂Ω is the graph of a
Lipschitz function near each α ∈ ∂Ω) is a set with locally ﬁnite perimeter.
L e tu sc o n s i d e rs o m ee x a m p l e ss a t i s f y i n gA s s u m p t i o n s1a n d2 .
Example 1 Assume that every consumer has an option to buy nothing and pay
nothing, i.e.
s0(α)=u(α,0).
6In this case Assumption 1 reduces to a weak single-crossing condition:
v(·,x) − v(·,0)
increases in α for every x. Although usually it is assumed that v(·,0) = 0 this
need not be so. For example, consider a consumer who has wealth w in her account
and lives for 2 periods. Her second period wealth can take to values wH or wL.
Let p be the probability that w = wH,a n dl e tδ ∈ (0,1) be the discount factor, so
that the private information of the consumer is characterized by a two-dimensional
vector α =( p,δ). The individual’s preferences are given by:
U(c1,c 2)=u(c1)+δEu(c2)
where c1 and c2 are the consumption levels in periods one and two respectively.
We will assume that wealth is not storable between periods. An individual may
approach a bank for a loan X. If she does so, she will be asked to repay t(X) is the
next period, provided her wealth is high and default if it is low. If the individual
chooses not to take the credit, her expected utility will be:
U0(p,δ)=u(w)+δ(pu(wH)+( 1− p)u(wL))
which is type dependent. Consider the following change of variables:
γ =1− δ, q =1− p, α =( γ,q),x= X, ∆u = u(wH) − u(wH − t(x)). (5)
Then,
u(α,x)=u(w + x) − u(w) − (1 − γ)(1− q)4u, (6)
which is strictly increasing in α. Therefore, this example satisﬁes Assumption 1.
Deﬁne, on (0,1)
2, the functions
g1 (α,1) = γ − 1,g 2 (α,0) = γ, g3 (α,1) = q − 1,g 4 (α,1) = q. (7)
7Then,
∇αg1 (α,1) = (1,0), ∇αg2 (α,0) = (1,0), ∇αg3 (α,1) = (0,1), ∇αg4 (α,0) = (0,1).
(8)
Moreover,
∇αu(α,x) = ((1 − q)∆u, (1 − γ)∆u), (9)
























Therefore, this example also satisﬁes Assumption 2. Note, however, that in this
example the preferences of the agents are not quasilinear. We will discuss this case
in Section 4.
The above example is a natural setting to discuss unavailability of credit to
some individuals, which is important to justify monetary equilibria in the search
theoretic models of money.5 The next example comes from the theory of industrial
organization.






where A>0 can be interpreted as utility of driving a car, and the second term in
(11) is a quality premium. Suppose a consumer has three choices: to buy a car
from the monopolist, to by a car from a competitive fringe, and to buy no car at
all. We will normalize the utility of buying no car at all to be zero. Assume the
competitive fringe serves low quality cars of quality −x0,w h e r ex0 ∈ Rn
++ at price
p. That is, the consumers experience disutility from the quality of the cars of the
competitive fringe, and the higher their type, the higher the disutility. The utility
5See, for example, Lagos and Wright (2005).
8of the outside option in this case is given by:




and is decreasing in α. Therefore, Assumption 1 holds.
Let us redeﬁne a consumer’s utility function by (3). Assumption 1 guarantees
that u(·,x) is increasing and we can reformulate the monopolist’s problem in the





(t(x(α)) − c(x(α)))f(α)dα (12)






(u(α,x) − t(x)) if max(u(α,x) − t(x)) ≥ 0
x(α)=0 otherwise
. (13)
We use t(·) to denote the the optimal tariﬀ.6
To be able to formulate and prove the main result we have to establish some
technical lemmata. For any Lebesgue measurable set E ⊂ Rm let Lm(E) denote its
Lebesgue measure. Let K(Rm) be the hyperspace of compact sets in Rm, endowed
with the topology induced by the Hausdorﬀ distance dH,g i v e nb y



















for all s ≥ 0,b o t hLm and Hs are upper semicontinuous functions in K(Rm) (Beer
(1975)). Hence the following lemma holds.
6See Basov (2005) for the conditions that ensure the existence of a solution.
9Lemma 1 Let E ∈ K(Rm) be such that Lm(E)=Hs(E)=0 ,f o rs o m es ≥ 0,
and let (Ek)k≥1 be a sequence in K(Rm) such that Ek → E.T h e nLm(Ek) → 0
and Hs(Ek) → 0.









so Lm(Ek) → 0, and analogously for Hs.¥
Lemma 1 establishes continuity of Lebesgue and Hausdorﬀ measures at zero.
It will be used below, when we prove the main result of this Section.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, Lm(Ω0)=0implies Ω0 ⊂ ∂Ω.
Proof. If Ω0 * ∂Ω,t h e r ei sα ∈ Ω0 and an ε>0 with Bε(α) ⊂ Ω.T h e n
Lm({β ∈ Ω : β ≤ α} ∩ Bε(α)) > 0. But because s(·) is increasing, {β ∈ Ω : β ≤
α} ∩ Bε(α) ⊂ Ω0, contradicting Lm(Ω0)=0 .¥
Lemma 2 states that if the exclusion set has Lebesgue measure zero it should
be part of the topological boundary of the type set. Assumption 1 is crucial for
this result. If it does not hold it is easy to come up with counter-examples even
in the unidimensional case.
Lemma 3 Assume Lm(Ω0)=0and Assumption 2 holds. Then Hm−1(Ω0)=0
for almost all β.
Proof. Let s(·) be the surplus function generated by the optimal tariﬀ via
(2). By Lemma 2, Ω0 ⊂ ∂Ω. Because Hm−1(∂Ω\∂eΩ)=0 ,c o n s i d e rΩ0 ∩ ∂eΩ,
which is given by
Ω0 ∩ ∂eΩ =
∞ S
i=1
Ω0i ∪ (N ∩ Ω0) (17)
where
Ω0i = {α ∈ Ω : gi(α,β)=0 ,s(α)=0 }, (18)
for i =1 ,2,....F o r e a c h Ω0i, Assumption 2 and the Transversality Theorem







for almost all β. Therefore, by the Implicit Function Theorem, Ω0i is a manifold of
10dimension of (m−2) for almost all β,s oHm−1(Ω0i)=0 . Hence Hm−1(Ω0∩∂eΩ) ≤
P∞
i=1 Hm−1(Ω0i)+Hm−1(N ∩ Ω0)=0for almost all β and we are done.¥
For any a,b ∈ Rm let (a·b) denote the inner product of a and b. The Generalized
Gauss-Green Theorem states that for any Ω with locally ﬁnite perimeter in U ⊂
Rm, and any Lipschitz continuous vector ﬁeld ϕ : U → Rm with compact support















is the divergence of the vector ﬁeld ϕ. Because of Assumption 1 we have ∇αu(α,x) ≥
0 for all α ∈ Ω ⊂ Rm





(α · ∇αu(α,x)) > 0 (20)
Because we can restrict the choices of x to lie in a compact subset X ⊂ Rn
+,s i n c e
they will never exceed the eﬃcient levels, it is without loss to assume that u(·,·) is
bounded on Ω × X. Therefore, we can assume that there exists a number K>0
such that
u(α,x) ≤ K(α · ∇αu(α,x))
for all (α,x) ∈ Ω × X. The following theorem holds.
Theorem 1 Consider problem (12)-(13) and assume that u(·,·) is twice continu-
ously diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing in both arguments, c(·) is strictly convex
and twice continuously diﬀerentiable, Ω is a set with locally ﬁnite perimeter in an
open set U ⊂ Rm, f(·) is Lipschitz continuous with supp(f)=Ω compact and
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Finally, assume that there exists a number K>0 such
that
u(α,x) ≤ K(α · ∇αu(α,x))
for all (α,x) ∈ Ω × X. Then, for almost all β, the set of consumers with zero
surplus at the equilibrium has positive measure.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume that Lm(Ω0)=0 . For any natural
11number k,l e tπk be the proﬁt obtained by selling to the types in
























Because every function above is bounded in Ωk, choose a common upper bound
B. Because s(α) ≤ 1







Now consider increasing the tariﬀ by 1
k. The consumers in the set Ωk will exit, and
πk will be lost, but each other consumer will pay 1
k more. Since the total number








From Lemma 4, for almost all β we have Hm−1(Ω0)=0 , and hence from
L e m m a1w eh a v eLm(Ωk) → 0 and Hm−1(Ωk) → 0 for almost all β,b e c a u s eo f
continuity of s(·) and the compact support of f(·).B u tt h e nf o rl a r g ek, ∆π must
be positive, contradicting the optimality of the tariﬀ.¥
Therefore, Theorem 1 shows that, generically, the set Ω0 = {α ∈ Ω : s(α)=0 }
has positive measure, generalizing Armstrong’s result. Strictly speaking, Ω0 is the
12set of consumers who have zero surplus, so it is not necessarily the case that a
positive measure of consumers will in fact be excluded. That is, a consumer may
have zero surplus because she does not consume at all or because she pays for her
consumption exactly her opportunity cost. In this latter case she is not excluded
from consumption. The following corollary shows that such consumers represent
a zero measure subset of Ω0. As a consequence, the set of excluded consumers
contains the interior of Ω0 and has positive measure.
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Theorem 1 a positive measure of consumers
will be excluded at the equilibrium for almost all β.
Proof. Suppose that a consumer α ∈ Ω0 does consume. Moreover, suppose
that there exists another consumer δ ∈ Ω0 with δ<α . Then, since u is strictly
increasing it must be the case that:
t(α)=u(α,x(α)) > u(α,x(δ)) >u(δ,x(δ)) = t(δ)
But then, u(α,x(δ)) − t(δ) > 0, which contradicts the optimality of the α-type
consumer’s choice. Therefore, if α ∈ Ω0 does consume, then every δ ∈ Ω0 with
δ<αis excluded from consumption. Hence, the set of agents in Ω0 who do
consume has zero measure.¥
Rochet and Stole (2003) provided an example where the exclusion set is empty.7
In their example u : Ω × R+ → R has a form
u(α,x)=( α1 + α2)x
and Ω is a rectangle with sides parallel to the 45 degrees and −45 degrees lines.
They argued that one can shift the rectangle suﬃciently far to the right to have an
empty exclusion region. Their result is driven by the fact that they allow only very
special collection of type sets, rectangles with parallel sides. Formally, Assumption
7Another example along similar lines is provided by Deneckere and Severinov (2009). Though
it is a bit more intricate and the authors provide suﬃcient conditions that ensure full participation
in the case of one quality dimension and two-dimensional characteristics, their condition also does
not hold generically.
















Note that a very small change in the type set changes that result. Suppose,
for example, that g1(α,β)=α1 +( 1+ε)α2 − β =0 , where ε is a small positive
real number. Then, Assumption 1 holds and Ω0 has positive measure, since, for
















Note that our results do not guarantee non-empty exclusion region for every
multidimensional screening problem. They rather assert that any problem for
w h i c ht h ee x c l u s i o nr e g i o ni se m p t yc a nb es l i g h t l yp e r t u r b e di ss u c haw a yt h a t
for the new problem a positive measure of the consumers will be excluded in equi-
librium. To understand the results intuitively, assume ﬁrst that in equilibrium all
consumers are served. First, note that at least one consumer should be indiﬀer-
ent between participating and not participating, since otherwise the tariﬀsc a nb e
uniformly increasing for everyone by a small amount, increasing the monopolist’s
proﬁts. Now, consider increasing the tariﬀ by ε>0, then the consumers who
earned surplus below ε will drop out. The measure of such consumers is o(ε),
unless iso-surplus hyper-surfaces happen to be parallel to the boundary of type
space. If condition (4) is violated then iso-surplus hyper-surfaces will be parallel
to the boundary of Ω by construction. We ruled that case out is our analysis.
However, such situation may still occur endogenously, which is the reason why our
result holds for almost all, rather then for all, screening problems. One class of
problems, for which full participation may occur are model with random outside
option. They were ﬁrst considered by Rochet and Stole (2002) for both monop-
olistic are oligopolistic settings and generalized by Basov and Yin (2010) for the
case of risk averse principal(s). Armstrong and Vickers (2001) considered another
generalization, allowing for multidimensional vertical types. In this type of model
the type consists of a vector of vertical characteristics, α ∈ Ω ⊂ Rm, and a para-
meter γ ∈ [0,1] capturing horizontal preferences. The type space is given by the
14Cartesian product Ω × [0,1] and γ is assumed to be distributed independently of
α. The utility of a consumer is given by:
u(α,x;γ)=v(α,x) − tγ, (23)
where t is a commonly known parameter. Let v(α,0) = 0 then iso-surplus hyper-
surface corresponding to zero quality is tγ =constant which is parallel to the verti-
cal boundary of type space γ =0 . Therefore, in such model there is a possibility of
full participation. The model was also investigated in oligopolistic setting, where
t was interpreted as a transportation cost for the Hotelling model. Conditions for
full participation under diﬀerent assumptions on dimensionality of α and the mo-
nopolist’s risk preferences were obtained by Armstrong and Vickers (2001), Rochet
and Stole (2002), and Basov and Yin (2010). Let us assume that the boundary of
set Ω is described by and equation
g0(α)=0 (24)
and embed our problem into a family of problems, for which boundary of the type
space is described by an equation
g(α,γ;β)=0 , (25)
where g(·,β):Ω × [0,1] → R is a smooth function such that
g(α,γ;0)=g0(α)(g0(α) − b)γ(γ − 1), (26)
for some constant b, i.e. for β =0the type space becomes the cylinder over the set
Ω considered by Armstrong and Vickers (2001). Our result is that for almost all β
the exclusion region is non-empty. However, as we saw above, for β =0exclusion
region may be empty.
We now consider another class of models, where full participation is possible.
The example will also be interesting, since it will allow us to investigate how the
relative measure of excluded consumers changes with dimension of Ω.














The type space is intersection of the region between balls with radii a and a +1
with Rn
+, i.e.
Ω = {α ∈ R
n
+ : a ≤ kαk ≤ a +1 }, (29)
where k·k denotes the Euclidean norm
kβk =






To solve for the optimal nonlinear tariﬀ with a ﬁxed number of characteristics start
by introducing the consumer surplus by:
s(α)=m a x (
n X
i=1
αixi − t(x)). (31)
The symmetry of the problem suggests that we look for a solution in a form
s = s(kαk)









f(r) = n +1+
rf0(r)
f(r)
s0(a +1 )=a +1
, (32)
w h e r ew ei n t r o d u c e dn o t a t i o nr ≡ kαk. To derive system (32) note that from the
envelope theorem
x = ∇s(α). (33)




[α · ∇s(α) − c(∇s(α)) − s(α)]dα (34)
s.t. s(·)-convex, s ≥ 0. (35)
(see Rochet and Chone, 1998). Dropping for a moment the convexity constraint,
one obtains the standard calculus of variations problem with free boundary. There-

















(see, Basov (2005)), where si denotes ith partial derivative of surplus and
L = α · ∇s(α) − c(∇s(α)) − s(α) (38)
But this is exactly system (32). Let us assume that types are distributed uniformly
on Ω, so the derivative of type distribution vanishes. Then, solving (32) one ob-
tains:8








Corresponding iso-surplus hyper-surfaces are given by intersection of a sphere
of appropriate dimension with Rn
+ They are parallel to the boundary, hence we have
a possibility of an empty exclusion region. To investigate this possibility further
note that the exclusion region is given by










8It is easy to check that the surplus function, corresponding to allocation (39) is convex,
therefore (39) solves the complete problem.
17Note that if n =1the exclusion region is empty if and only if a>1,i fn =2it is
empty if and only if a>1/(
√







the exclusion region is non-empty for any a>0 for suﬃciently large n.T h e
relative measure of the excluded consumer’s (the measure of excluded consumers
if we normalize the total measure of consumers to be one for all n)i s :
ζ =
(a +1 ) n/(n +1 )− an
(a +1 ) n − an . (43)
It is easy to see that as n →∞the measure of excluded consumers converges to
zero as 1/n, i.e. exclusion becomes asymptotically less important. This accords
with results obtained by Armstrong (1999a). The convergence, however, is not
monotone. For example, if a =1 .3 the measure of excluded customers ﬁrst rises
from zero for n =1to 11.6% for n =5 , and falls slowly thereafter. For a =2
maximal exclusion of 8.3% occurs for n =1 1and for a =0 .7 maximal exclusion
of 19.7% of consumers obtains when n =2 .
Note also that though asymptotically higher fraction of consumers gets served
as n →∞ , this does not mean that the consumers become better oﬀ. Indeed, as
n →∞the radius of the exclusion region converges to (a +1 ) , therefore almost
all served consumers are located near the upper boundary. This means that the
trade-oﬀ between eﬃcient provision of quality and minimization of information
rates disappears. The monopolist provides asymptotically eﬃcient quality but is
able to appropriate almost the entire surplus.
3 The Genericity of Exclusion in an Oligopolistic
Screening Model
Consider a framework similar to the one of the previous section but assume
that the market is served by K producers. The production cost is identical among
the producers, who play a one shot-game. A pure strategy of a producer k is a
non-linear tariﬀ, i.e. a measurable mapping tk : Rn
+ → R. Consider a symmetric
18pure strategy Nash equilibrium at which all producers charge the same tariﬀ.W e
will argue that at such an equilibrium a positive measure of the consumers are not
served.
Assume that, in equilibrium, producer k charges tariﬀ tk(·):Rn

















v(α,x) − t(x) if max
x∈Rn
+
(v(α,x) − t(x)) ≥ s0 (x)
x(α)=0 otherwise
where ⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨








xj = x, xj ≥ 0
, (44)
and







and t−k(x) solves problem (44) subject to an additional constraint xk =0 .E q u a -
tion (45) states that the outside option of a consumer seen from the point of view
of producer k is determined by her best opportunity outside the market and the














where xj(α) is the equilibrium quantity purchased by the consumer of type α

















u(α,xk) − tk(xk) if max
xk∈Rn
+
(u(α,xk) − tk(xk)) ≥ 0
xk(α)=0 otherwise
(46)




for all i,j.T h e nu(α,xk) is strictly increasing in α for all xk ∈ Rn
+.
Theorem 2 Under the assumptions of Theorem 1 a positive measure of consumers
will be excluded in any symmetric equilibrium of the oligopolistic market.
Proof. Consider oligopolist 1. Given the behavior of her competitors, her
problem is isomorphic to the problem of the monopolist, with appropriately rede-
ﬁned utility. Therefore, Theorem 1 implies that she will ﬁnd it optimal to exclude
a positive measure of consumers. By symmetry, so will the other oligopolists. Fi-
nally, by symmetry again, each oligopolist will exclude the same set of consumers,
so the intersection the sets of excluded consumers has positive measure.¥
Champsuar and Rochet (1989) note that the proﬁt functions of the oligopolists
can become discontinuous when there are bunching regions. Even though Basov
(2005) shows that bunching in the multidimensional case is not as typical as sug-
gested by Rochet and Chone (1998), existence of an equilibrium is not a trivial
matter in the oligopoly game above. We now show that under some conditions a
symmetric equilibrium exists.
Let M be a bound on the utility function, and note that it is also a bound on the
tariﬀs, and hence it must be that no producer will ever produce x with c(x) >M.
So it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to tariﬀs t : C → [0,M]
where C ⊂ Rm
+ is compact. Assume that producers choose Lipschitz continuous
20tariﬀs, so that the strategy space of each producer k is
T
k = T = {t : C → [0,M] s.t. t is Lipschitz continuous}. (47)
Using the sup norm, it follows from the Arzela-Ascoli’s theorem that T is compact.
Assume that when producers choose a symmetric proﬁle (t,...,t) of tariﬀs, the
solution to the maximization problem of the consumers is also symmetric: x1 =
··· = xK. It follows that proﬁts are symmetric: πk(t,...,t)=π(t,...,t) for k =
1,...,K. Hence the game played by the producers, (T ×···×T,π),i ss y m m e t r i c .
Let P(t,...,t)={s ∈ T : π(t,...,s,...,t) >π (t,...,t)} denote a producer’s strict
upper contour set when others choose the same tariﬀ t (we use π(t,....,s,...,t) to
denote the proﬁt of a given producer when he/she chooses s and all the others
choose t).
Deﬁnition 1 A symmetric game (T ×···×T,π) is diagonally quasiconcave if
t/ ∈ coP(t,...,t) (48)
for each t ∈ T,w h e r eco denotes the convex hull of a set.
Deﬁnition 2 A symmetric game (T ×···×T,π) is continuously secure if for
every symmetric proﬁle (t,..,t) that is not an equilibrium there exists a continuous
function
f(t,...,t) :( s,...,s) 7→ z ∈ T (49)
such that
f(t,...,t)(s,...,s) ∈ P(s,...,s), (50)
for each s in an open neighborhood of t.
Applying the argument in Theorem 2.2 in Barelli and Soza (2009) we have:
Lemma 5 A symmetric game (T ×···×T,π),w h e r eT is compact and convex, has
a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium whenever it is diagonally quasiconcave
and continuously secure.
Proof. See appendix.¥
Theorem 3 Assume that the game played by the producers satisﬁes the assump-
tions above, so it is a compact, convex, symmetric. Assume further that it is
diagonally quasiconcave game. Then there exists a symmetric pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
21Proof. We show that, although discontinuous, the game is continuously secure.
For each non equilibrium proﬁle (t,...,t), there exists a proﬁle (¯ t,...,¯ t) with ¯ t ∈
P(t,...,t).P u t
f(t,...,t)(s,...,s)=¯ t +( s − t) (51)
for any s in a neighborhood of t.T h e nf(t,...,t)(·) is continuous and
f(t,...,t)(s,...,s)(x) R s(x) (52)
if and only if ¯ t(x) R t(x), so if consumers choose a given producer oﬀering ¯ t
at x when all the others oﬀer t, they also choose the same producer when she
oﬀers f(t,...,t)(s,...,s) and the others oﬀer s. This means that the discontinu-
ities arising due to either Bertrand-like competition or bunching are avoided, and








when faced with the proﬁle (s,...,s) of tariﬀs, where x(s) is the optimal solution if
there was only one ﬁrm oﬀering tariﬀ s. It follows that π(s,...,s) is also continuous
in s,s ow eh a v ef(t,...,t)(s,...,s) ∈ P(s,...,s) for every s in a neighborhood of t.¥
The assumption of diagonal quasiconcavity restricts some of the allowed densi-
ties f(·). Alternatively, we can work with the mixed extension of the game, where
quasiconcavity obtains, and use the argument above to conclude that a symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium exists. Note that the argument in Theorems 1 and 2
remain valid in the mixed extension.
Let us now assume that the number of producers is not ﬁx e db u tt h e r ei sa
positive entry cost F>0. It is easy to see that this problem can be reduced
to the previous one, since equilibrium number of the producers is always ﬁnite.
Indeed, with K producers the proﬁts of an oligopolist in a symmetric equilibrium
are bounded by πm/K, where πm are the proﬁts of a monopolist. Therefore, at
equilibrium K ≤ πm/F and a positive measure of the consumers will be excluded
from the market.
224 The Genericity of Exclusion Without the Qua-
silinearity Hypothesis
In this Section we relax the quasilinearity assumption. It is not diﬃcult to
ﬁnd economically interesting examples, where the most natural formulation leads
to a consumer’s utility, which is not quasilinear in money. Consider, for example,
the following model of grant allocation (Bardsley and Basov, 2004). Risk averse
institutions compete for grants for completing a research project. A project, if
successful, will result in the provision of a public good whose value to the society
is equal to one. Diﬀerent institutions have projects that diﬀer in the cost of
completion and the probability of success. The government can choose an up-front
payment and the prize in the case of success and is interested in maximizing the
beneﬁts of the society minus the completion costs. The institutions are assumed
to be politically small, so there expected proﬁts do not enter the government’s
objective. If one denotes the cost of the project c, the probability of success q,
the up-front payment t and the prize for success x, the utility of the institution
conditional on participation in the government’s scheme will be
v(c,a;x,t)=qv(t + x − c)+( 1− q)v(t − c), (54)
which is not quasilinear in the up-front payment. Another example is an insurance
company, which faces customers that diﬀer in their loss probability and the degree
of risk-aversion. The competitive variant of this model was ﬁrst considered by
Smart (2000) and Villeneuve (2003).
Let Ω ⊂ Rm
+ be a convex, open, bounded set and the utility of consumer of
type α who obtains good of quality x and pays t is
v(α,x,t), (55)
where v is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in x and α and continuously diﬀeren-
tiable in t . Moreover, we assume that v is strictly increasing in the consumer’s
type and quality and strictly decreasing in the tariﬀ paid. Given a tariﬀ t(x) deﬁne
23t h ec o n s u m e r ’ ss u r p l u s ,s(·) by:
s(α)=m a x
x v(α,x,t(x)). (56)





(t(x(α)) − c(x(α)))f(α)dα (57)






(v(α,x,t(x)) if max(u(α,x,t(x)) ≥ s0(α)
x(α)=x0(α) otherwise
, (58)
where x0(α) is the outside option, which implements surplus s0(α).
For any continuous function ϕ(·), let τ(α,x,ϕ(α)) be the unique solution of
the equation
ϕ = v(·,·,τ) (59)
and let
u(α,x)=τ(α,x,s 0(α)) (60)
In the quasilinear case equation (60) reduces to equation (3). Note that, since the
function τ(α,x,·) is strictly decreasing, and the optimal surplus satisﬁes s(α) ≥
s0(α) the optimal tariﬀ paid by type α satisﬁes
t(x(α)) ≤ u(α,x(α)). (61)
Assumptions 1 and 2 should be modiﬁed to read:
Assumption 3 For any x ∈ Rn
+, the net utility gain of consumption u(·,x) deﬁned
by (60)is strictly increasing in α.
Note that the preferences described in Example 2 satisfy this assumption.
Assumption 4 For each i =1 ,2...,
Ki = {α ∈ Ω : gi(α,β)=0 },
where gi : Ω × RJ → R is smooth, β ∈ RJ, J ≥ 1, are parameters and, for all
24x ∈ Rn







Now one can prove the analogs of lemmata 1 to 4, where Assumptions 1 and 2 are
replaced by Assumptions 3 and 4 respectively. The previous proofs apply verbatim
and are omitted. This observation together with (61) allow us to formulate a
following theorem:
Theorem 4 Consider problem (57)-(58) and assume that v(·,·) is twice continu-
ously diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing in both arguments, c(·) is strictly convex
and twice continuously diﬀerentiable, Ω is a set with locally ﬁnite perimeter in an
open set U ⊂ Rm, f(·) is Lipschitz continuous with supp(f)=Ω compact and
Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Finally, assume that there exists a number K>0 such
that
u(α,x) ≤ K(α · ∇αu(α,x))
for all (α,x) ∈ Ω×X. Then for almost all β the set of consumers with zero surplus
at the equilibrium has positive measure.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1. For any natural number k,
let πk be the proﬁt obtained by selling to the types in














The rest of the proof is identical to Theorem 1 and is omitted.¥
255 An Application to the Regulation of a Monop-
olist with Unknown Demand and Cost Func-
tions
Armstrong (1999b) reviews Lewis and Sappington (1988) study of the opti-
mal regulation of a monopolist ﬁrm when the ﬁrm’s private information is two
dimensional. In this study, a single product monopolist faces a stochastic demand
function given by q(p)=a + θ − p,w h e r ep is the product’s price, a is a ﬁxed




⊂ R+.T h eﬁrm’s cost is represented by the function C (q)=( c0 − c)q +K,
where q is the quantity produced, c0 and K are ﬁxed parameters and c is a stochas-
tic component to the cost, taking values in an interval9 [−c,−c] ⊂ R−. The ﬁrm
observes both the demand and the cost functions, but the regulator only knows
that α =( θ,c) is distributed according to the strictly positive continuous density




× [−c,−c]. For the sake of feasibility
we assume that a + θ>c 0 − c for all α =( θ,c) ∈ Ω, i.e., the highest demand
exceeds marginal costs, for all possible realizations of the stochastic components
of demand and costs.
The regulator wants to maximize social welfare and presents to the monopolist
a menu of contracts {p,T (p)}.I f t h e ﬁrm chooses contract (p,T (p)) it sells its
p r o d u c ta tp r i c ep and receives subsidy T (p) from the regulator.
Therefore, the regulator’s problem is to select a continuous subsidy schedule








(a + θ − p(α))












{(a + θ − p)(p − c0 + c)
−K + T(p)}
if max{((a + θ − p)(p − c0 + c)
−K + T(p)} ≥ 0
{a + θ} otherwise
The ﬁrst term in the regulator’s objective function, 1
2 (a + θ − p(α))
2,c o r r e -
sponds to the consumer’s surplus while the second term, T (α),i st h es u b s i d yc o s t .
The choice of p(α) by the monopolist depends on whether she can derive nonneg-
ative returns when producing. If that is not possible, she will choose p(α)=a+θ
and there will be zero demand, i.e., the ﬁrm "shuts down".
A fundamental hypothesis in Lewis and Sappington’s analysis is that the pa-
rameter a can be chosen suﬃciently large relative to parameters K and c0 so that
a ﬁrm will always ﬁnd it in its interest to produce, even for the very small values
of θ. However, Armstrong (1999b) shows that such a hypothesis cannot be made




×[−c,−c]=[ 0 ,1]×[−1,0]. Furthermore, when Ω
is a strictly convex subset of that square, Armstrong (1999b) uses the optimality
of exclusion theorem in Armstrong (1996) to show that some ﬁrms will necessarily
shut down under the optimal regulatory policy, in equilibrium. Armstrong (1999b)
adds “... I believe that the condition that the support be convex is strongly suf-
ﬁcient and that it will be the usual case that exclusion is optimal, even if a is
much larger than the maximum possible marginal cost.” That insight could not
be pursued further due to a lack of a more general result, and Armstrong (1999b)
switched to a discrete-type model in order to check the robustness of the main
conclusions in Lewis and Sappington (1988).
Let us review this problem in the language of the present paper. Consider the
following change of variables. Change p with x and deﬁne the following functions:





(a + θ − x)
2













u(α,x) − t(x) if max(u(α,x) − t(x)) ≥ 0
{a + θ} otherwise
(65)
Note that this is essentially the standard problem solved in our original model.
In order to apply Theorem 1, ﬁr s tn o t et h a ti ti ss u ﬃcient that the conditions
of Assumptions 1 and 2 hold at the agents’s optimal choice of x,g i v e nh i st y p eα,
i.e., at the equilibrium x(α).
Now notice that u(α,x) is strictly increasing in c,a sl o n ga sa+θ−x>0.B u t
this is always the case for x(α),s i n c ea +θ − x(α) is a demand curve. Moreover,
u(α,x) is strictly increasing in θ,a sl o n ga sx−c0 +c>0.T h i si sa g a i nt h ec a s e
for x(α) since this is the diﬀerence between price and marginal cost. Therefore,
u(α) is strictly increasing in α for the relevant choice of price.
Deﬁne g by:
g1 (α,0) = θ,g2 (α,1) = θ − 1,g 3 (α,−1) = c +1 ,.g 4 (α,0) = c. (66)
Then we can deﬁne
Σ1 = {α ∈ Ω : g1 (α,θ)=0 }
Σ2 =
©






Σ3 = {α ∈ Ω : g3 (α,−c)=0 }
Σ4 = {α ∈ Ω : g4 (α,−c)=0 }
. (67)






Moreover, the gradient of function u is
∇αu(α,x)=( x − c0 + c,a + θ − x) (68)
28and
∇αgi(α,β)=( 1 ,0),i=1 ,2,∇αgj(α,β)=( 0 ,1),j=1 ,2. (69)





















In particular, the rank of these matrices is 210. Therefore, Assumptions 1 and
2a r es a t i s ﬁed in this model, as well as all remaining hypothesis of Theorem1.
Hence we may conclude that a set of positive ﬁrms will generically be "excluded"
from the regulated market, i.e., will not produce at all. This example conﬁrms
Armstrong’s (1999) conjecture.
6 An Application to Involuntary Unemployment
Consider a ﬁrm in an industry that produces n goods captured by a vector
x ∈ Rn
+.T h eﬁrm hires workers to produces these goods. A worker is characterized
b yt h ec o s ts h eb e a r si no r d e rt op r o d u c eg o o d sx ∈ Rn
+,w h i c hi sg i v e nb yt h ee ﬀort
cost function e(α,x). The parameter α ∈ Ω ⊂ Rm is the worker’s unobservable
type distributed on an open, bounded, set Ω ⊂ Rm according to a strictly positive,
continuous density function f(·).
Therefore, if a worker of type α is hired to produce output x and receives wage
ω(x), her utility is ω(x)−c(α,x). If the worker is not hired by the ﬁrm, she will
receive a net utility s0 (α),e i t h e rb yw o r k i n go nad i ﬀerent ﬁrm, or by receiving
unemployment compensation.
Suppose the ﬁrm sells its product for competitive international prices, p(x).
10Indeed, it cannot be the case that x = p = c0 − c = a + θ since the price cannot be, at
the same time, the marginal cost (prefect competitive price) and the price that makes demand
vanish.
29Then, the ﬁrm’s problem is to select a wage schedule ω(·):Rn













ω(x) − e(α,x) if max
x∈Rn
+
ω(x) − e(α,x) ≥ s0 (x)
x(α)=0 otherwise
(72)
Consider the following change in variables: t(x)=−ω(x), v(α,x)=−e(α,x),













v(α,x) − t(x) if max
x∈Rn
+
(v(α,x) − t(x)) ≥ s0 (x)
x(α)=0 otherwise
(73)
Therefore, the same arguments that have been presented for the monopolist
can also be extended for the hiring decision of the ﬁrm. In particular, the ﬁrm
will generically ﬁnd it optimal not to hire a set of positive measure. If the ﬁrm is
a monopsonist in the region in the sense that agents can only work at that ﬁrm,
then Theorem 1 presents a new explanation for involuntary unemployment. Note
that, according to Theorem 2, the result can be extended to a region with several
ﬁrms hiring for the production of goods x ∈ Rn
+, so that there is an oligopsony
for workers, as long as the corresponding industry is the only source of formal
work. This is true even in the case of free entry in that industry, according to the
comment following Theorem 2. Finally, if one includes the category of informal
work (underemployment) as unemployment, the present model suggests that an
informal sector will generically exist in equilibrium.
30This application is, to the knowledge of the authors, the ﬁrst explanation of
involuntary unemployment based on the adverse selection problem, whereby ﬁrms
decide to oﬀer a wage schedule that excludes some less productive workers so they
can require higher output levels from the more productive ones.
7 Conclusions
Armstrong’s (1996) exclusion result applies quite widely to a diverse set of
markets in the economy and, as such, oﬀers a deep insight into the workings of
market economies. In general, outside of the very special cases of perfect compe-
tition, complete and perfect information, or unidimensional private information,
we should expect to see exclusion operating in markets. We have explored, in this
paper, ﬁve diverse settings where we believe this result applies: credit markets,
automobiles, research grants, monopoly regulation, and labor markets. Further
applications, and further depth on these applications, seem warranted for future
research. 11
A Appendix
A set Ω ⊂ Rm has ﬁnite perimeter in an open set U ⊂ Rm if A∩U is measurable
and there exists a ﬁnite Borel measure μ on U and a Borel function v : U →






for every Lipschitz continuous vector ﬁeld ϕ : U → Rm with compact support U,
where Sm−1 is the m−1 dimensional unit sphere. The perimeter of Ω in U is given
by μ(V ).As e tΩ ⊂ Rm is of locally ﬁnite perimeter if μ(V ) < ∞ for every open
proper subset of U.T h emeasure theoretic boundary of Ω is given by
∂e(Ω)={x ∈ R
m :0< L
m(Ω ∩ Bε(x)) < L
m(Bε(x)), ∀ε>0}
11Another interesting extension is the auction-theoretic setting considered in Monteiro, Svaiter,
and Page, (2001).
31where Lm is the mdimensional Lebesgue measure and Bε(x) is the open ball
centered at x with radius ε>0.W h e n Ω has locally ﬁnite perimeter we have
∂eΩ =
S∞
i=1 Ki ∪ N,w h e r eKi is a compact subset of a C1 hypersurface Si,f o r
i =1 ,2,...,a n dHm−1(N)=0where Hm−1 is the m − 1 dimensional Hausdorﬀ
measure, and a C1 hypersurface S ⊂ Rm is a set for which ∂S is the graph of a
smooth function near each x ∈ ∂S.T h emeasure theoretic unit outer normal vΩ(x)
of Ω at x is the unique point u ∈ Sm−1 such that θ
m(O,x)=θ
m(I,x)=0 ,w h e r e
O = {y ∈ Ω :( y − x) · u>0} and I = {y/ ∈ Ω :( y − x) · u<0},a n dθ
m(A,x) is
the mdimensional density at x. The reduced boundary ∂∗Ω is the set of points x
for which Ω has a measure theoretic unit outer normal at x. For a set of locally
ﬁnite perimeter Ω the three boundaries ∂Ω, ∂eΩ and ∂∗Ω are up to Hm−1 null-sets
the same.
Proof of Lemma 5 Assume to the contrary, and let ∆ be the diagonal in
T ×···×T.T h e nf o re a c h(t,..,t) ∈ ∆ there exists an open neighborhood Ut as
in the deﬁnition of continuous security. The family {V(t,...,t)}(t,...,t)∈∆ with
V(t,...,t) = Ut ×···×Ut ∩ ∆ (74)
forms an open cover of the compact set ∆. There is, therefore, a partition of unity
gi : ∆ → [0,1] subordinated to a ﬁnite subcover {Vi} of {V(t,...,t)}(t,...,t)∈∆,w h i c h








Now, f is continuous and must have a ﬁxed point
(z,...z)=f(z,...z). (76)
But
f(z,...z) ∈ coP(z,...,z) ×···×coP(z,...,t), (77)
contradicting diagonal quasiconcavity.¥
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